表１　京都・京都周辺土一揆年表 (Years in which ikki occured in Kyoto or in the vicinity of Kyoto)

足軽と土一揆：
応仁の乱後も大名たちが京都に駐屯（ちゅうとん）させていた足軽の掠奪（りゃくだつ）ばりがうかがわれるが、ここで足軽のことを「土一揆」と言いかえていることが目がつく。つまり、両方とも同じものなのだというわけである。このような見方は奈良では常識だったらしく、一条兼良（かねら）の息子で興福寺大乗院の門跡尋尊は、応仁の乱中の文明四年、次のように述べていた。 「京都、山城の痩せ侍（やせさむらい）どもの一党がみずから「足白」（あしじろ）（足軽と同じ歩兵）と号し、土民のように蜂起（ほうき）した。これは近年土民たちがみずから足軽と号して好き放題をするため、このようなことが起きたのである。これほどの亡国の原因はない」（41）

足軽」も「土民のように蜂起する」－足軽の同類である。足軽とは土民の蜂起、すなわち土一揆のことと見なされていた。（40－41）

土一揆は徳政要求、つまり前に述べたように、「本来の持ち主」の権利に基づき、それを行使する「徳政」と号として土倉や酒屋を襲撃（しゅうげき）した。個々の土一揆参加者の実情がどうであろうと、振りかざした(wield)大義名分(legitimacy, right to action)は「徳政」であった。（41）

一方、足軽の掠奪もまた大義名分に基づくものだった。それは戦士としての権利である兵糧米の確保ということである。文明十一年（一四七九）奈良で防衛のため越智・古市の配下を動員することが決定されたとき、大乗院尋尊は次のような危惧（きぐ）をもらしている。「彼らを動員すれば、彼らはひっきりなしに、ほうぼうで掠奪を行うだろう。もともと給与するための兵糧の備えなどないのたから、京都の場合と同様に足軽自身に兵糧調達を許可するしかなかった。そうなれば奈良は滅亡する」と。実際足軽は奈良で「棟別銭」（むなべちせん）（一軒ごとに課せられる税金）を掛けたりしている。(42) 出陣の準備として土倉を襲撃して、物質を奪取（だっしゅ）したことがある。ここでは、中世という時代に兵を動員するということがどのようなものかをかいま見させるような事件である。土一揆のなかで行動する大名被官の姿が想起されよう。彼らもまた土倉・酒屋を襲う（おそう）大義名分をもっていたのかもしれない。ともかく従軍の代償として土倉・酒屋からの掠奪が公然と行われてきた以上、足軽の兵糧調達を理由とする掠奪も全面的な取締りは困難だったのだろう。(42)

土一揆の組織・足軽の募集：
このようにみれば、大義名分の中味はそれぞれに異なっても、土倉・酒屋からの掠奪という目的、大義名分をふりかざしての掠奪という行動形態では、土一揆と足軽もきわめて類似している。だからこそ、その行動は酷似している。応仁の乱のさなかの文明四年（一四七二）京都では、「足軽どもの沙汰」として徳政を行われた。文明十二年に京都で蜂起した土一揆は酒屋、土倉に兵糧米を賦課（ふか）し、伏見宮家や右大臣今出川教季（のりすえ）らから酒肴料（しゅこうりょう）を徴収（ちょうしゅう）した。酒代を徴収するといえば、この年、奈良で土一揆が起こったとき、興福寺は内々で酒代を与えて退散するよう申し付けたところ、そのまま騒動は収まった（おさまった）という。足軽も徳政を行ったし、また土一揆も兵糧米を徴収した。両者を同じものとする見方も相当の根拠をもっていたのである。(４３) (which is to say, the phenomenon of tsuchi ikki, with its emphasis on attacks on granaries, storage houses, and brewers, bore very close similarity to the actions of ashigaru, who in order to gain reparations and to for prepare for conflict would also raid granaries and storage houses. This, according to Prof.Kanda, leads one to the conclusion that they may have been inter-related)

足軽集団の形成：
そもそも足軽集団とはどのように形成されるものなのだろうか。文明三年正月ごろ、遍照心院領（へんしょうしんいんりょう）の住民で足軽大将の馬切衛門五郎というものが京都の八条で足軽の募集を行った。領内からこれに加わる者が出ることを危惧した東寺は公人（くにん）（寺の下級役人）、諸坊の使用人、力者（力役（りきえき）に従事する下僕）。境内の百姓らに足軽に加わらないよう不動堂の前で起請（神仏への誓約―せいやく）をさせた (ie, this was the action of the temple)。その折り、以前足軽に加わったことがあると白状し、起請だけは勘弁してほしいと訴えた諸院の下部も現われたという。足軽集団は大将の募集に応じ、そのもとに寺で召し（めし）使う下部たちや、あるいは領内の百姓らがそれぞれの事情から結集していくという実情をうかがうことができる。 寛正三年（一四六二）に京都を襲った土一揆が想起されよう。大将の蓮田兵衛のもとに東福寺門前・宇賀汁子・南禅寺門前などの寺領、伏見、竹田など京都の南の村から、あるいは遠く丹波国須智村から、さらに法苑寺など寺院内部から三々五々結集して徳政一揆が蜂起したのである。 ただちに同一とは見られないものの、足軽集団と土一揆とは極めてよく似た方法で結成されたのではないか、と思われる。だから、領主を通じ、在所を通じて起請文を提出させて取締まることも土一揆と変わりなかった。(４４) (The formation of an ashigaru group, according to the information given above, meant assembling the `underlings` of the temple complexes and the peasantry. This was `no different to the method of raising a tsuchi ikki`. A summons, the release of a statement declaring one`s intent, and then protest and vandalism).

東寺領での足軽の取締り(control of)はまさにこうしたものであった。文明九年、東福寺の寺家被官や門前住民らが足軽に加わっていると噂があり、幕府は東福寺にその禁庄を求めているが、これも同様である。当時一流の知識人一条兼良が将軍足利義尚に政治の要諦（ようてい）を講義した「樵談治要」（しょうだんちよう）では「超過したる悪党」足軽に触れて「それぞれの主人に命じられて取締らせ、土民百姓性なら在所に命じて取締まらせれば、鎮庄できないこともない」。 在所から起請文を徴収し、伊勢氏のような主人を介して取締まった土一揆との類似はもはや明らかではないだろうか。（４４）

Yet this still leaves the question as to why anyone would wish to become part of an ashigaru group? According to one record, a certain Mizushi (御厨子) who was captain of one of the ashigaru groups affiliated with the forces of the western army of Hatakeyama Yoshi(nari?) during the Ōnin war had originally been an inhabitant of the area in front of Tōfukuji, yet had not been able to meet his familial obligations, and as he had a love of fighting he had decided to form a group of troops on his own. This particular scenario closely resembles that surrounding a tsuchi ikki described in the Bunshō Ki (文正記) which deals with the political turmoil that occurred amongst many daimyo immediately before the outbreak of the Ōnin war. Those ordinary citizens of this age who were unable to pay their taxes nor keep to the ‘straight and narrow’、who had abandoned the rural life and acquired a knowledge of warfare, who had bought their lineage, trained themselves in the ways of banditry, obtained some status and thus become the ringleader of a tokusei, were the model for ashigaru.(45)

Hence the soldiers of an ashigaru group had originally been general peasants, yet they had forsaken both their farms and homes to follow the path of conflict, a point that echoes in the experience of tsuchi ikki and ashigaru alike. We would do well to remember that there were participants in the raids on Kyoto who shouldn`t have had any reason to want to demand the repeal of debts for the storehouses and breweries of Kyoto, people known as `country folk`, or phenomena like the regional ikki from Tanba which moved down into Kyoto. The very act of abandoning one`s home to march on the capital was a formula shared by both ashigaru and tsuchi ikki.(45)

Yet why Kyoto? tsuchi ikki gradually, as poor harvests resulted from bad weather, came to face the spectre of starvation. A look at the data suggests that tsuchi ikki that attacked the capital had a close relationship with the on-set of natural disaster. Most of the years which saw an outbreak of tsuchi ikki had faced disaster or famine in the year leading up to the outbreak of protest. Hence it became standard practice for the villages to move into the capital when starvation threatened the countryside. What they hoped was to be able to receive relief from the various daimyo and the Bakufu in the capital.(45) An example will spread further light on this subject. In the 29th year of Ōei (1422) there occurred a great famine. Many of those persons living near the Fushimi Shō then resolved to travel to the capital. Peasantry in Kawachi (particularly mothers and children) forsook their homes during a period of drought and became `rumin` (流民) `vagrants, or wanderers` begging for food `乙食`(Otsu Jiki) along the way to the capital. These particular sort of people were known as `hinin` 非人 upon their arrival in the capital and were the focus of action to relieve suffering. Some years before the Ōnin war, a very great famine known as the `Kanshō Famine 寛正の飢饉` had struck the nation. It was supposedly through the prayers of a priest named Ganami (願阿弥) that many were saved, hence the Ashikaga Shōgun Yoshimasa ordered him to performed official rites and help to relieve the suffering. In the Rokkakudo of Kyoto, in the south, many makeshift houses were built, and weak chestnut and rice porridge fed to the starving. The finances for all of this were paid for through the Kanjin, (collected by priests), with a donation of 100 kanbun.(47)

It thus became standard practice to go to the capital during a year of famine and seek relief, and was a commonly shared belief but the peasantry of most provinces during this age. To put this another way, when a tsuchi ikki marched on the capital, the `rumin` who had already forsaken their villages and gone to the capital should have already felt satisfied with their lot. Yet amidst the `country folk` (田舎者) from the regions who participated in the ikki, it would not be too far fetched to think that some of these `rumin` had also intermingled with them. To attack the granaries and breweries was a means for these starving `rumin` to relieve their dilemma and force the government into action.(47) Hence both tsuchi ikki and ashigaru were, like the `rumin`, people of the land. A great many of them, for reasons such as famine, would forsake their homes, seek employment, and make their way to the capital. Hence most if not all were prepared to exercise their right to demand relief from the government.(48)

In the logic of the time, it was the duty of policymakers (ie the Bakufu) to provide for those who had been forced to leave their homes because of famine, and who had fallen on such hard times that in the capital they had come to be known as `hinin`. Hence a `tokusei` issued by a tsuchi ikki for justification for attacking granaries and breweries, and the attack on granaries and breweries by ashigaru out of justification for the need for `military supplies` (heiryō – 兵糧) meant that both phenomena insisted on their legitimate right to `plunder`. (48).

To fight in order to eat:
This in part stems from the work done by Prof.Fujiki Hisashi, who has noted that the peasantry were often faced with the reality of having to fight in order to avoid starvation. In the period immediately before the Ōnin war, those `rumin` who had made their way to the capital, as well as the tsuchi ikki and ashigaru had all come to demand `war in order to eat`, had no other viable form of employment available to them. The conflict between the Shiba, Hatakeyama, Hosokawa, and Yamana, those households that were the most powerful supporters of the Bakufu, gave rise to opportunities for battle. In the 3rd year of Kyōtoku (1454), the internecine strife afflicting the Hatakeyama household grew worse, and with it came the phenomena of tsuchi ikki. The `rumin` thus were able to secure a place for themselves in the capital within the armies of the great daimyo houses.

When seen in this light, the constant repetition of tsuchi ikki by `miscellaneous troops` derived from `rumin` should not strike one as unusual. For those daimyo in the capital, far from their home bases, unable to do anything but watch proceedings, the provision and procurement of a large armed force was essential, and the existence of `rumin` was the means to give them the military strength that they required (although Prof.Kanda does not mention exactly how they would have acquired this proficiency in arms, unless he means to suggest that they merely provided the numbers in order to swell the ranks. If this is true, then the description is similar to that of the Monto described in the conflict in Mikawa – an army mostly derived from vagrants). At any rate, these daimyo were prepared to use men who were willing to put their lives at risk `in order to eat` as auxiliaries. In this sense, the phenomenon of ashigaru that came to signify civil war had its origins in the desperation of such men. To put it another way, the daimyo had managed to tame the fire of tsuchi ikki, the same fire that had made `rumin` attack granaries and breweries for food, in order to use it for their own armies.(50)

Just how a daimyo might use these `rumin` is illustrated in the following point. In the 17th year of Bunmei (1485), after the Ōnin war had ended, a large tsuchi ikki occurred in Kyoto that attacked granaries and breweries and demanded the enforcement of a tokusei. This particular incident was led by two `auxiliaries` - non-regular – troops of Hosokawa Masamoto named Miyoshi and Mononobe. Masamoto himself had been conducting a review of the tsuchi ikki troops in front of his residence. In the following year, auxiliaries of the Hosokawa had again called for a tokusei and assembled at Tōji. However this time the shōgun Ashikaga Yoshi(尚)masa persistently issued orders to Masamoto to reign in his troops and prevent them from carrying out their actions, and thus no ikki occurred. Two years later in the 2nd year of Kyōchō (1488), rumours began to spread that once again the auxiliaries of the Hosokawa were planning to launch a tokusei, however the issue of orders from Ashikaga Yoshimasa prevented this from taking place. Afterwards tsuchi ikki occurred on an almost yearly basis, leading some to lament the state of affairs that the capital had fallen into. One particular auxiliary of the Hosokawa forces, a man by the name of Uchida Yagorō, managed to win the favor of Masamoto, and thus was appointed as a self-styled `general leader of tsuchi ikki`.(51)

Hence the Ōnin war and its aftermath provided `rumin` with the opportunity for employment and thus accounts for their major presence during that conflict. The Ōnin Ryakuki 「応仁略記」notes that after the political change of the Bunsei era, once the army of Hatakeyama Yoshi(就) had left Kyoto, an anti-Hatakeyama uprising took place in the capital, and taking advantage of this, tsuchi ikki from Nishioka, Fushimi, Fukakusa, Yodo, and Toba assembled in the capital night after night, demanding tokusei and raiding the granaries and breweries. This type of action was probably the type that the leaders of `rumin` were hoping for, considering that such forces made up one significant part of their armies. Once the Ōnin war began, the phenomenon of tsuchi ikki all but dried up, as the battlefield became the main source of income for those who had `to fight in order to eat`. Although it may appear that the daimyo who used these `rumin` had manipulated them into fighting, it would be more appropriate to consider that the daimyo had been forced to act so that their armies could eat.

Hence the main role played during the Ōnin war, tsuchi ikki, and ashigaru was that which belonged to the rural dweller. Thus it truly was the age of `gekokujō`. Of course, one would have to remember that the main victims of such turmoil were the rural dwellers themselves, particularly the weaker members of such a society. Only the turn of fate would decide whether one could live or die and that could change very rapidly. (52-53)

表２　　京都周辺土一揆と災害相関年表 (Years in which ikki broke out in the vicinity of Kyoto together with natural disasters)

(Certainly there appears to have been a yearly calamity for the central region of Japan leading up to the opening of the sixteenth century, yet afterwards the tsuchi ikki occur with less frequency, and coincide with a fall in the more prevalent forms of disaster – namely floods and drought. Yet there are years in the early sixteenth century for which no disasters are recorded yet tsuchi ikki still occurred, and are quite interspersed in years. So the question is – if tsuchi ikki occurred in years in which no calamity was recorded, what drove them to act in this manner? It is possible that this occurred as a result of conflict around the capital region, yet only an examination of records would show this.) (46)

The Pure Land, and the occurrence of ikkō ikki: What believers in this faith wanted more than anything else was to be reborn into the `Pure Land`. When one faced an agonizing death in battle, to be able to travel to a land of peace where one would be saved by the grace of Amidha was, for the samurai and commoners of a world in conflict, the reward that they coveted for their time spent among the living. The most important clause that a believer had to fulfill in order to be reborn was an unshakable belief that you would be saved by Amidha Buddha, and only through his mercy could you achieve your place in the Pure Land, a practice known as the Shinjin Ketsujō (信心決定). This particular facet of belief provided some of these barriers to the initial codification and organization of the Honganji sect, for with the emphasis on belief in Amidha Buddha there was little to convince the commoners of the need for a priesthood or any sort of hierarchy, a particular dilemma resolved by Rennyo through the propogation of O-fumi and the emphasis on pictures outlining the blood lineage that he and Honganji shared with Shinran. (134-135)

Traditionally the idea of rebirth had a strong basis in the medieval and middle ages psyche. Yet this form of belief, in which by performing good works beyond those of others one might be awarded a place in paradise, led to the creation of individual value or `worth` in regard to access to the afterlife. To counter this, Rennyo said that no matter how illustrious a person might be, if he or she was of little faith, then they were not worth trusting. Trust should only be given to those whom one knows to be a fellow believer. The effect of this was to convince believers that they all shared common values, and that they should look upon one another as brothers irrespective of their social background. This sort of mentality can be seen in a passage from the Honfukuji Atogaki of Katata, which states that `the person to whom you can entrust your belongings is the person of faith, a person blessed by fortune. No matter what treasures are given to them they will not steal them, for they refrain from taking or meddling in the property of others`. This, as Prof.Kanda points out, led to the phenomenon of a rudimentary form of delivery service known as Monto Tsutai (often used by daimyo), in which a package entrusted for delivery through the Monto would arrive at its destination using the organization of the Monto as the means of delivery. In a world so rife with political and religious strife, it was testimony to the sense of communal bonding between Monto that such an organization existed. This sense of belonging, of being part of a much larger system of faith, was what kept the Monto together.(138)

The other point that should be emphasized was the practice among the Monto of reaffirming their faith through the practice of `consultation`, which resembled, in many ways, the meeting held before the decision to raise an ikki. It was Rennyo who had suggested that in order for all within the Monto to act as a group or be of one mind, it was important that these consultations be held, so that any grievances could aired and resolved and all be `in agreement` (一味同心). While it might be far fetched to suggest that the practice of the affirmation of faith might have been directly contributed to resolutions to form ikki, ikki had already existed in the middle ages for some time before the reforms of Rennyo, and it is possible that many warriors and commoners had engaged in an act of `affirmation of one mind` in the past, thus leading to a sense of familiarity in what Rennyo had proposed (the practice of ichimi shinsui, for example). In order to receive the blessings of rebirth in the afterlife, the Monto had to act in accordance with the precepts laid out for ikki. Through the resolution of the Monto, all would be joined together as one in order to fulfill their task. The shared beliefs of those in the Monto, pronounced correct and just by the organization of Honganji using the concept of `一味の安心`, had a very strong effect in maintaining the bonds between believers, and aided the powerful uprisings launched by the Monto.(139)

The organization of the Monto, and leadership by Honganji: The basic unit of the Honganji Monto consisted of the `priest`, in other words, a monk who had been delegated to lead the Monto. If a particular group had not yet been designated as a Honganji temple but as believers, then they could assemble for lectures according to a proscribed series of rules. These units (priests or lecture groups) were affiliated with the upper echelons of Honganji for their respective regions, and were finally organized under the auspices of the head priest (or Honzan Shūsu – 本山宗主) who resided in Honganji. This centrally focused organization was one of the special characteristics of Honganji. (139-140)

The head priest of Honganji was seen as the legitimate successor to the founder of the sect, Shinran, and thus possessing particular knowledge in relation to the faith. It was his duty to convey the teachings of Amidha to the faithful, and to continue the relations with acolytes in temples and found new residences. The head priest, who stood at the apex of all of the Monto, was the direct descendant of Shinran, who through his bloodline possessed the right to decide on the position of the faithful in the afterlife, and who also possessed the right to decide on the efficacy (or not) of policies and actions. However, although the head priest should have been acknowledged by the entire Honganji organization, its councilors and upper priesthood, and all of the Monto as the legitimate head of the faith, among the faithful themselves this was not always the case.(140)

Jitsugo wrote an anecdote in relation to Rennyo, stating that when Rennyo was residing in Honganji, a dispute broke out amongst the groups of believers over his position. It appears that Rennyo`s father, Jitsunyo, had another son by his wife Niyoen-ni named Ōgen, and although Rennyo was the eldest son, it appears that Niyoen wished for Ōgen to take the position at the head of the organization. In regard to the process of succession in the middle ages, the wife of the former head of the family, in other words the widow or `後家`, was seen as the legitimate purveyor of the will of the former head, and her right to be heard was quite powerful. Although Rennyo had received a notice of relinquishment from his father Jitsunyo and thus was officially the head of Honganji, such was the power of authority held by the widow of the former head that one section of the Honganji main family, councilors, and unaffiliated priesthood created a joint signature document, bound themselves together in an ikki and declared their support for Ōgen (to summarize, although the entire organization started to head in the direction of support for Ōgen, the younger brother of Jitsunyo, Niyojō, was opposed to the move, and he managed to persuade the organization to allow Rennyo to continue on in his position. In the end, the organization came around to support this position, and decided to keep Rennyo on in his place at the head of the temple).(140-141)

(Prof.Kanda then gives examples of where the main branch of Honganji and the regional Monto could disagree on matters of politics, specifically citing the conflict between Hosokawa Masamoto and the Hatakeyama family – in essence – Honganji supported Masamoto, whereas the Monto of Settsu and Kawachi were in favor of the Hatakeyama, and attempted to usurp Jitsunyo (successor to Rennyo)`s position by naming Rennyo`s ninth son Jitsuken as the head of the organization. In the end the Monto lost and were disbanded. This in turn beggars the question – who were the leaders of the Monto of Settsu and Kawachi, and what was their background? If they favoured the Hatakeyama, its possible that they were either kokumin or persons of some social standing, not of the priesthood).(141) In a sense, these sort of conflicts resembled those of the daimyo houses. Although the Monto might have acted against the head priest of Honganji and formed an ikki, they did not seek to put themselves in his place but elect another of the direct bloodline to the head of the organization. This made their disputes the same as those which would affect the households of daimyo at the time.) (142)

The Monto ikki – involved the entire apparatus of Honganji. Each was considered to be a member of the ikki if so ordered by Honganji. This was the case during the Tenbun conflict (天文の争乱), the battle of Ishiyama Honganji, and the Eishō conflict. One single ikki member constituted one part of the entire ikkō ikki, thus the reason why, under the orders of the head priest, an ikki could be raised over such a broad area. Many smaller ikki could band together to create a larger entity. The head priest would announce his proclamation to the Monto through the use of `Gosho` (御書). Ordinarily these documents would contain writings on Buddhist doctrine and the means to preserve faith. Yet on occasion they were used for the purpose of conveying orders to the faithful on military matters. Of course, these orders incorporated the will of the head priest, yet they were also seen as providing the resolution ordinarily derived from a Monto meeting.(142-143)

This then leads back to the discussion on the O-fumi. The O-fumi conveyed what the Monto were supposed to do vis-à-vis their practices of belief, and any that disobeyed their instructions were to be excommunicated. What it essentially stated was that the will of the head priest of absolute in matters of discussion. The O-fumi also contained passages stating that it was necessary on occasion to risk one`s life and fight for one`s faith. The author of this passage was Rennyo, yet the document also contains the signatures of a `tayashū`, 他屋衆, basically the names of the leaders of the other Monto who were assembled in Yoshizaki at the time. Hence the will of the head priest became synonymous with the decisions of the Monto. Note that the decision to take over Kaga province was done in the name of the head priest of Honganji. Also, the head priest could adopt the will of the ikki and issue orders of his own in relation to its conduct.(143).